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The Glass Half Full: Envisioning the Future of Race Preference Policies 
By Leslie Yalof Garfield1
 
Abstract 
 
Justice Breyer’s concern that the Court’s June 2007 ruling in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 
School District. No. 1  “is a decision the Court and nation will come to regret”  is not well founded.  Far from limiting 
the constitutionally permissible use of race in education from its present restriction to higher education, the case may 
allow governmental entities to consider race as a factor to achieve diversity in grades K-12.   In Parents Involved, which 
the Court decided with its companion case, McFarland v. Jefferson County Public Schools four justices concluded that 
school boards may never consider race when assigning students to particular schools.    Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in 
the 4-1-4 decision, like that of the dissent, acknowledged that a compelling governmental interest in achieving diversity 
justifies a school board’s use of race conscious school assignment plans.   His opinion could swing the Court to a position 
that is favorable to those who believe race-preference policies are paramount to achieving a society free from segregation.   
The Supreme Court’s fractured opinion in Parents Involved is reminiscent of the first time the Court 
considered an Equal Protection challenge to an academic institution employing a race-preference program.  In this recent 
decision a divided court ruled that the Louisville and Seattle School districts could not use race as a factor in 
determining which school a particular student would attend.  The Court split itself in a manner similar to the Court in 
University of California v. Bakke,   where a fractured Court ruled that the University of California Medical School 
could not set aside a certain number of seats for minority applicants whose objective admissions criteria were not equal to 
that of their non-minority peers.  Commentators warned that the Court’s decision potentially limited educational 
opportunities for minorities and also vitiated the important strides of the civil rights movement. 
The reality of the Bakke decision, however, unveiled itself quite differently than anyone reading the Court’s 
opinions might have predicted.  Five justices agreed that the University of California Medical School’s program violated 
the Equal Protection Clause and four justices asserted that race could never be a factor in the admissions process.  
Justice Powell wrote a majority opinion in which 4 justices joined in his conclusion, but no single justice joined in his 
reasoning.  His opinion acknowledged that in certain instances, states or their agencies could use race as a factor in 
ensuring diversity and that while the University of California plan violated the Constitution, not all plans that use race 
would meet with the same fatal result.  Justice Powell’s “majority of one” has had historic consequences on the race-
preference legal debate.  This opinion served as the leading precedent in defining the limits of constitutionally permissible 
government regulations aimed at remedying present effects of past discrimination and aimed at achieving racial balance.   
If the Bakke case is to serve as precedent in the truest sense of the word, then following Parents Involved the future of 
affirmative action is not necessary as gloomy as Justices, Lawyers and Commentators predict.    
I argue that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence supports an expansion of the permissible use of race-preference policies.  
My review of the Court’s reliance on concurring opinions supports my conclusion that in the right instances, a future 
court can adopt a single justice’s voice and use it to take the court in a very different direction.  Thus, despite Justice 
Breyer’s dire prediction history suggests that there is some room for optimism that governmental entities, in the proper 
instances, will remain free to employ race-preference programs. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Leslie Yalof Garfield, Prof. of Law, Pace Law School (B.A. Fla. 1982; J.D. Fla 1985) The author would like to 
express deep gratitude to Mary Duty, Christina Golkin and especially Megan McDonald for their wonderful 
research assistance and to Jane Crawford for her editorial advice.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Justice Breyer’s concern that the Court’s June 2007 ruling in Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School District. No. 12  “is a decision the Court and nation will come to 
regret”3  is not well founded.  Far from limiting the constitutionally permissible use of race 
in education from its present restriction to higher education, the case may allow 
governmental entities to consider race as a factor to achieve diversity in grades K-12.4   In 
Parents Involved, which the Court decided with its companion case, McFarland v. Jefferson County 
Public Schools5 four justices concluded that school boards may never consider race when 
                                                 
2 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1226 (W.D. Wash. 
2001), rev’d, 285 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir. 2002), injunction granted, No. 01-35450, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 7678, at *1 
(9th Cir. Apr. 26, 2002), reh’g granted, 294 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2002), certifying questions to Wash. Sup. Ct., 294 F.3d 
1085 (9th Cir. 2002), certified questions answered, 72 P.3d 151 (Wash. 2003), rev’d, 377 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2004), reh’g 
granted en banc, 395 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2005), aff’d, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2351 
(June 5, 2006), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (June 28, 2007). 
3 Id. at 2837 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
4 See infra notes 173-206 and accompanying text. 
5See McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Schs. 330 F.Supp 2d 834 (W.D. Ky. 2004), aff’d sub nom., McFarland ex 
rel. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Schs., 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted sub nom., Meredith v. 
Jefferson County  Bd. Of Educ., 126 S. Ct. 2351 (June 5, 2006), rev’d sub nom., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. 
v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (June 28, 2007).  
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assigning students to particular schools.6    Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in the 4-1-4 
decision, like that of the dissent, acknowledged that a compelling governmental interest in 
achieving diversity justifies a school board’s use of race conscious school assignment plans.7   
His opinion could swing the Court to a position that is favorable to those who believe race-
preference policies are paramount to achieving a society free from segregation.   
The Supreme Court’s fractured opinion in Parents Involved is reminiscent of the first 
time the Court considered an Equal Protection challenge to an academic institution 
employing a race-preference program.  In this recent decision a divided court ruled that the 
Louisville and Seattle School districts could not use race as a factor in determining which 
school a particular student would attend.  The Court split itself in a manner similar to the 
Court in University of California v. Bakke,8  where a fractured Court ruled that the University of 
California Medical School could not set aside a certain number of seats for minority 
applicants whose objective admissions criteria were not equal to that of their non-minority 
peers.9  Commentators warned that the Court’s decision potentially limited educational 
opportunities for minorities and also vitiated the important strides of the civil rights 
movement.10
The reality of the Bakke decision, however, unveiled itself quite differently than 
anyone reading the Court’s opinions might have predicted.  Five justices agreed that the 
University of California Medical School’s program violated the Equal Protection Clause and 
                                                 
6 See infra notes 101-123 and accompanying text.  
7 See infra notes 124-45 and accompanying text.  
8 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
9 Id. at 271. 
10 See, e.g., Michael Selmi, The Life of Bakke:  An Affirmative Action Retrospective, 87 Geo. L.J. 981, 1005 (1999) 
(quoting, inter alia, historian and journalist Lerone Bennett, Jr., who stated that Bakke would send blacks “back 
to the end of the line,” and William T. Coleman, Chairman of the NAACP’s Legal Defense and Education 
Fund, who said “[the] Bakke case turns the 14th Amendment on its head”).  See also Editorial, Resegregation Now, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2007, at A28 (stating in response to the Meredith and Parents Involved decisions, “[the Court] 
is moving in reverse, broadly ordering the public schools to become more segregated”). 
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four justices asserted that race could never be a factor in the admissions process.11  Justice 
Powell wrote a majority opinion in which 4 Justices joined in his conclusion, but no single 
justice joined in his reasoning.  His opinion acknowledged that in certain instances, states or 
their agencies could use race as a factor in ensuring diversity and that while the University of 
California plan violated the Constitution, not all plans that use race would meet with the 
same fatal result.12  Justice Powell’s “majority of one” has had historic consequences on the 
race-preference legal debate.  His opinion served as the leading precedent in defining the 
limits of constitutionally permissible government regulations aimed at remedying present 
effects of past discrimination and aimed at achieving racial balance.13  If the Bakke case is to 
serve as precedent in the truest sense of the word, then following Parents Involved the future 
of affirmative action is not necessary as gloomy as justices, Lawyers and Commentators 
predict.14    
This article explores the future of race-preference plans after the Parents Involved 
decision.  Part I of this article reviews the Bakke decision and highlights its legacy on the 
race-preference plan debate.  Part II of this article discusses the McFarland and Parents Involved 
decisions and pays particular attention to the dialogue between the plurality, concurrence and 
the dissent.  Part III of this article considers the future of race-preference policies following 
the 2007 decisions and evaluates whether the language of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence will 
                                                 
11 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 271-72. 
12 Id. at 320 (“the state has a substantial interest that legitimately may be served by a properly devised 
admissions program involving the competitive consideration of race”). 
13 See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (the Court relied heavily on 
Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion in upholding certain race-conscious FCC minority ownership policies); Grutter 
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (the Court explicitly adopted Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion in upholding the 
University of Michigan Law School’s race-conscious admissions policy).  
14 See generally Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2800 app. (Breyer, 
Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg, J.J., dissenting) (2007); Jonathan D. Glater & Alan Finder, School Diversity Based on 
Income Segregates Some, N.Y. Times, July 15, 2007;   American Association for Affirmative Action Calls Supreme 
Court Decision on School Desegregation Cases “A Blow to Equal Opportunity in Education”, 
http://affirmact.blogspot.com (June 28, 2007); Linda Greenhouse, Justices, Voting 5-4, Limit the Use of Race in 
Integration Plans, N.Y. Times, June 29, 2007. 
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have the same force and effect as Justice Powell’s concurrence in Bakke.  Ultimately, this 
article concludes that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence offers a promise to extend the use of 
race-preference plans beyond higher education to programs aimed at achieving diversity in 
grades K-12.  
 
I. BAKKE AND ITS LEGACY 
 
A. THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA V. BAKKE 
 
The Court first considered race-preference policies aimed at achieving diversity for in the 
classroom when it heard University of California v. Bakke.15  Allen Bakke, a white male, 
unsuccessfully applied for admission to the University of at California at Davis Medical 
School in 1973 and in 1974.16 He challenged the school's 1973 admissions policy, adopted in 
an effort to diversify its entering class, on the grounds that it operated to exclude him from 
the school on the basis of his race. Bakke argued the policy as violated the Equal Protection 
Clause,17 the California Constitution,18 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.19  
                                                 
15 See Gail Heriot, Thoughts on Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger as Law and as Practical Politics, 36 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 137, 145-146 (2004) (noting that the issue of race-based admissions policies in higher education first 
reached the Court in the 1974 case of DeFunis v. Odegaard.  However, the Court dismissed the case as moot 
because the Italian-American student who challenged the policy had been admitted to the University of 
Washington Law School pursuant to a lower court order and already was preparing to graduate when the case 
reached the Court.  Because the Court dismissed DeFunis, the Bakke case was “second in time, but first in 
historic significance”).   
16 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 266. 
17 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of Citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”).  
18 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(b) (“[a] citizen or class of citizens may not be granted privileges or immunities not 
granted on the same terms to all citizens.  Privileges or immunities granted by the Legislature may be altered or 
revoked”).  
19 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (“[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, 
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance”). 
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University of California admission policy divided applicants into two groups. One group was 
comprised of non-minority applicants who had achieved a minimum 2.5 UGPA, non-
minority applicants were otherwise not considered.20 A separate “special admissions” group 
contained all “disadvantaged” applicants in 1973 and minority applicants in 1974, regardless 
of undergraduate GPA or MCAT score.21  The school set aside a certain number of seats for 
applicants in each of the groups.22 Individuals from the general applicant pool could not fill 
seats from the “special admissions” or minority applicant pool, even if seats were available 
after the admissions committee considered all minority applicants.23  
When Davis rejected Bakke in 1973, four seats reserved for applicants from the “special 
admissions” pool were unfilled while the seats for the general admission pool were filled.24 
Davis rejected Bakke again in 1974 although the school accepted minority applicants with 
lower test scores.25 Following the second rejection, Allen Bakke sued the Regents of the 
University of California in state court seeking an injunction to allow him admission.26  
The trial court found that Davis' admission policy was a racial quota and held that it 
violated the California and United States Constitutions, as well as Title VI.27 The California 
Supreme Court affirmed. Applying strict scrutiny, it concluded that the program was 
unconstitutional.    A majority of the court concluded that an entity is prohibited from 
considering race in programs that use government funds. Thus, the court ordered the 
University of California to admit Bakke into its medical school. Upon the state's appeal, the 
                                                 
20 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 273. 
21 Id. at 274-75. 
22 Id. at 275. 
23 Id. at 279 (“the University did not challenge the finding that applicants who were not members of a minority 
group were excluded from consideration in the special admissions process”). 
24 Id. at 276. 
25 Id. at 277. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 278-79. 
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Supreme Court granted certiorari.28  
The Supreme Court, while considering both the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI 
affirmed the California Supreme Court's decision.29  The Court was sharply divided in its 
reasoning.30  Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion31  in which he recognized three issues 
in need of resolution:  First, whether the issue before it was reviewable under the 14th 
Amendment of the Constitution.32  Second, if it decided the case based on Constitutional 
grounds whether strict scrutiny was the appropriate level of review of the admissions 
policy.33  Finally, whether the admissions policy met its burden under that particular level of 
scrutiny.34
Regarding the first issue, Justice Powell wrote that “decisions based on race or ethnic 
origin by faculties and administrations of state universities are reviewable under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”35  Programs or policies with “benign” racial classifications are 
only permissible if they withstand the Court's exacting scrutiny; he would have permitted the 
University of California admission policy if it were "precisely tailored to serve a compelling 
                                                 
28 Id. at 281. 
29 Id. at 271. 
30 Id. at 269-72. No other Justice joined Justice Powell’s opinion.  Justice Brennan, Justice White, Justice 
Marshall and Justice Blackmun filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.  
Justice White, Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmun each filed separate opinions.  Justice Stevens filed an 
opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, which Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stewart 
and Justice Rehnquist joined. 
31 Id. at 269. 
32 Id. at 287.  While the parties differed over whether the University’s program constituted a “goal” of minority 
representation or a “racial quota,” Justice Powell declared, “[t]his semantic distinction is beside the point: The 
special admissions program is undeniably a classification based on race and ethnic background. To the extent 
that there existed a pool of at least minimally qualified minority applicants to fill the 16 special admissions seats, 
white applicants could compete only for 84 seats in the entering class, rather than the 100 open to minority 
applicants. Whether this limitation is described as a quota or a goal, it is a line drawn on the basis of race and 
ethnic status.” Id. at 288-89.
33 Id. at 287-88. 
34 Id. at 290-91. 
35 Id. at 287. Justice Powell noted that the petitioner agreed with this.  Id.  He further noted, “[t]he guarantee of 
equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a 
person of another color.  If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal.” Id. at 289-90. 
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governmental interest."36  This language became the genesis of the “strict scrutiny” test.37  A 
state or state agency meets the strict scrutiny test when it demonstrates a compelling 
governmental interest and provides support that the program or policy it developed was 
narrowly tailored to meet that compelling governmental interest.38
   Justice Powell found a compelling governmental interest in remedying present 
effects of past discrimination and in “ameliorating the disabling effects of discrimination.39 
In this instance, however, there was no evidence in the record that the purpose of the 
University of California program was to meet either of these objectives.40  Justice Powell 
defined a second compelling governmental interest in creating a diverse student body.41   
Justice Powell wrote, “A great deal of learning occurs informally.  It occurs through 
interactions among students of both sexes; of different races, religion and backgrounds; who 
came from cities and rural areas, from various states and countries; who have a wide variety 
of interests, talents and perspectives; and who are able, directly or indirectly, to learn from 
their differences and to stimulate one another to reexamine even their most deeply held 
assumptions about themselves and their world.”42  According to Justice Powell, therefore, in 
                                                 
36 Id. at 299. 
37 See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986) (any preference based on racial or 
ethnic criteria must receive a “most searching” examination to ensure it meets two criteria: it “must be justified 
by a compelling governmental interest,” and it must be “narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal”); 
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166-67 (1987) (a policy survives strict scrutiny when it is “narrowly 
tailored” to serve a “compelling purpose”); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (the University of 
Michigan Law School’s race-conscious admissions policy passed the strict scrutiny test because “the Equal 
Protection Clause does not prohibit the…narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a 
compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body”). 
38 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305 (“[in] order to justify the use of a suspect classification, a State must show that its 
purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification ‘is 
necessary…to the accomplishment’ of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest”). Id.. 
39 Id. at 310. 
40 Id. at 310. State may have an interest in educating minorities who will go back and serve their 
underrepresented communities, but there is no evidence in the record that the purpose of the admissions 
program is to ensure that that will happen. 
41 Id. at 311-12. “the attainment of a diverse student body . . . is a constitutionally permissible goal for an 
institute of higher education.”41  Id. at 311-312. 
42 Id. at 313 n.48 
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the right instances, an institute of higher education could consider race as a factor in 
admissions decisions without impermissibly infringing on the Constitution. 
 While Justice Powell found a compelling governmental interest in the University of 
California admission’s policy goals, he did not find that the policy was narrowly tailored to 
meet that interest.43  The University of California admission policy, which set aside a specific 
number of seats for students in identified minority groups, created a quota that unfairly 
benefited the interest of a victimized group at the expense of other innocent individuals.44 
Additionally, its practice of having separate admissions sub-committees review minority and 
non-minority candidates inappropriately insulated applicants from comparison against the 
entire admissions pool.45 Finally, according to Justice Powell, there were other, less 
restrictive means by which the University of California could meet its goals.  For these 
reasons, Justice Powell concluded that the University of California admissions policy violated 
the Equal Protection Clause and therefore was constitutionally impermissible. 
Justices Brennan, Marshall, White and Blackmun agreed with most of Justice 
Powell’s reasoning but disagreed with his finding that the University of California program 
was unconstitutional and for that reason they concurred in the judgment in part and 
dissented in the ruling.46   Specifically the justices agreed that racial classifications are not per 
se unconstitutional under the 14th Amendment and that any race-preference programs 
should be subject to strict scrutiny.  The four justices, however, would have voted to uphold 
the University of California Program since its “purpose of remedying the effects of past 
societal discrimination is . . . sufficiently important to justify the use of race-conscious 
admissions programs where there is a sound basis for concluding that minority under 
                                                 
43 Id. at 320. 
44 See id. at 289-90, 319-320 
45 See id. at 319-20. 
46 Id. at 325-26 (Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, J.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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representation is substantial and chronic, and that the handicap of past discrimination is 
impeding access of minorities to the Medical School.”47
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part with which   
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist joined.  The justices found that the 
University of California program violated Title VI and therefore joined Justice Powell in his 
conclusion that the program was invalid.  Since they were satisfied with their finding based 
on statutory grounds, these justices found no need to consider the constitutional issue.48
 Justice Powell’s opinion left a two-fold legacy for future case law.  First, it mandated 
that challenges to race-preference programs be subjected to the strictest scrutiny.49 Second, it 
provided support to proponents of race-preference programs by holding that there is a 
compelling governmental interest in the non-remedial goal of promoting diversity in the 
classroom. A review of post-Bakke challenges illustrates the profound influence of Powell’s 
“majority of one.”50  
 
B. DEFINING THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARAMETERS OF RACE-PREFERENCE POLICIES 
POST-BAKKE 
 
 1. THE STRICT SCRUTINY TEST 
 
 
                                                 
47 Id. at 362 (Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, J.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
48 Id. at 412-13 (Burger, Stevens, Stewart, Rehnquist, C.J., J.J., (concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in 
part). 
49 See id. at 290. 
50 But see, Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). In Fullilove v. Klutznick, the United States Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of the Minority Business Enterprise (MBE) provision of the Public Works 
Employment Act of 1977. Id. The Court in Fullilove stated, “[t]his opinion does not adopt, either expressly or 
implicitly, the formulas of analysis articulated in such cases as [Bakke].” Id. at 492.   Instead, the Court reasoned 
“that the MBE provision would survive judicial review under either ‘test’ articulated in the several Bakke 
opinions[.]” and therefore the Court deemed the provision constitutional without relying on any specific 
formula. Id. Justice Powell joined the plurality opinion in Fullilove; however, he also wrote a concurrence in 
which he applied his Bakke test to the instant case (and deemed that the policy met the test’s standards). Id. at 
496 (Powell, J., concurring).   
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 Immediately after Justice Powell’s Bakke decision, the Court wrestled with whether 
Powell’s articulated strict scrutiny test was the appropriate level for review for all race-
preference policies.  In several early cases the Court chose to defer the issue.  In Fullilove v. 
Klutzinick,51 Chief Justice Berger wrote that the “. . . opinion does not adopt, either expressly 
or implicitly, the formulas of an analysis articulated in such cases as [Bakke.]”52  In  Local 28 
of Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,53  a 
plurality of the Court acknowledged that they “[had] not agreed…on the proper test to be 
applied in analyzing the constitutionality of race-conscious remedial measures.”54  In Wygant 
v. Jackson Board of Education,55 Justice Powell referred to his language in Bakke to enunciate 
the present strict scrutiny test.56  Following Wygant, where race-based programs are 
concerned, the racial classification must be justified by “a compelling state purpose, and the 
means chosen by the State to effectuate that purpose must be narrowly tailored.”57  
                                                 
51 448 U.S. 448 (1980).  
52 Id. at 492. 
53 478 U.S. 421 (1986). 
54 Id. at 480. The Sheet Metal Workers case was filed in response to a 1975 order that required the plaintiffs to 
end discriminatory practices. Id. at 426. They were also ordered to give a number of non-whites union 
membership. Id. They were later found guilty of contempt for ignoring these court orders. Id. They filed this 
suit to challenge the remedial purpose of Title VII which “empowers a district court to order race-conscious 
relief that may benefit individuals who are not identified victims of unlawful discrimination.” Id. at 426. The 
Court found this constitutional.  Id. at 440. Despite the justices’ continued disagreement regarding the level of 
scrutiny to be applied when reviewing race-based policies, the plurality held that “[w]e need not resolve this 
dispute here, since we conclude that the relief ordered in this case passes even the most rigorous test-it is 
narrowly tailored to further the Government’s compelling interest in remedying past discrimination.” Id. at 480. 
55 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
56 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291-99). See generally Leslie Yalof Garfield, Back to Bakke: 
Defining the Strict Scrutiny Test for Affirmative Action Policies Aimed at Achieving Diversity in the Classroom, 83 NEB. L. 
REV. 631 (2005). The Wygant Court considered a collective bargaining agreement between the Board of 
Education and a teachers’ union that provided for layoffs by seniority where the percentage of minorities laid 
off would exceed the percentage of minorities employed at the time. Leslie Yalof Garfield, Back to Bakke: 
Defining the Strict Scrutiny Test for Affirmative Action Policies Aimed at Achieving Diversity in the Classroom, 83 NEB. L. 
REV. 631, 640 n. 56 (2005) (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274). 
57 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 267. For an indepth discussion of the strict scrutiny test see Richard Fallon, Strict Judicial 
Scrutiny, 54 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1267 (2007).  
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The Court took the opportunity to more clearly define strict scrutiny the following year, 
when it decided United States v. Paradise.58 The court in Paradise considered the 
constitutionality of a one-black-to-one-white promotion plan that the Alabama Department 
of Public Safety adopted pursuant to a district court consent decree.59 Since its mandate to 
promote some state troopers based on race was a race-conscious policy, the Court applied a 
strict scrutiny standard.60 The Court would uphold the decree only if Alabama could 
demonstrate that its policy was “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental 
purpose.”61  The Court upheld the use of strict quotas in this case as one of the only means 
of combating the department's overt and defiant racism.62  By 1995 when the Court decided 
Adarand Constructor, Inc. v. Pena63, Justice Powell’s strict scrutiny test was no longer challenged 
because it was now the only articulated test appropriate for review of race-preference 
programs.64
 
                                                 
58 Paradise, 480 U.S. 149. 
59 Garfield, supra note 58, at 641 n. 59 (citing Paradise, 480 U.S. 149). 
60 Paradise, 480 U.S. at 167. 
61 “Relying on Wygant, Justice Brennan acknowledged that there is a compelling governmental interest in 
remedying present effects of past discrimination.” Garfield, supra note 58 at 641 (citing Paradise, 480 U.S. at 
183-85). “However, because the Court had not previously defined precisely what ‘narrowly tailored’ meant, it 
availed itself of the opportunity to provide further guidance to future courts and articulated the narrowly 
tailored element of the strict scrutiny test. The justices unanimously concluded that the appropriate 
considerations for finding whether a race-based program was narrowly tailored included: (1) the necessity for 
the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies; (2) the flexibility and duration of the relief; (3) the 
relationship between the numerical goals and the relevant labor market; and (4) the impact of the relief on the 
rights of third parties. Garfield, supra note 58 at 641 (citing Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171; Sheet Metal Workers, 478 
U.S. at 487 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).  
62 Paradise, 480 U.S. at 165-66 (quoting Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F.2d 1514, 1532-33 (11th Cir. 1985). 
63  515 U.S. 200 (1995), remanded to 965 F.Supp. 1556 (D. Colo. 1997), vacated sub nom., Adarand Constructors, 
Inc. v. Slater, 169 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. granted and judgment reversed, 528 U.S. 216 (2000), remanded to 
228 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 532 U.S. 941 (2001), 
order amended, 532 U.S. 967 (2001); see also, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
244 (2003); McFarland ex rel. McFarland v. Jefferson County  Pub. Schs., 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. 
granted sub nom., Meredith v. Jefferson County Pub. Schs., 126 S.Ct. 2351 (2006), rev’d and remanded sub nom., 
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S.Ct. 2738 (2007), remanded to No. 01-35450, 
2007 WL 2379254 (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2007); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Disc. No. 1, 426 
F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d and remanded, 127 S.Ct. 2738 (2007), remanded to No. 01-35450, 2007 WL 2379254 
(9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2007). 
64 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227. 
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2. THE COMPELLING GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST STANDARD 
 
Justice Powell’s ruling that there is a compelling governmental interest in considering 
race as a factor in race-preference programs has served to support defenders of several race-
preference challenges.    Where a previous governmental entity has engaged in segregate 
practices, the current government is always permitted to enact race-preference policies to 
reverse its previous wrongs.   In Bakke Justice Powell articulated a second compelling 
governmental interest in promoting exposure to diverse voices in the classroom.  The 
University of California admissions program’s goal of admitting minority applicants to its 
medical program met the compelling governmental interest prong of the strict scrutiny test.   
In City of Richmond v. Croson65 the Court discussed the compelling governmental interest test 
in the context of a non-remedial race-preference program adopted outside the classroom.  
The Croson Court, which evaluated the constitutionality of a Richmond program setting aside 
30% of city construction funds for black-owned businesses, concluded that in some 
instances there is a compelling governmental interest in favoring one race over another.66  
The City of Richmond’s goal of remedying various forms of past discrimination in and of 
itself was far too amorphous a goal to support a compelling governmental interest.67
 In Grutter v. Bollinger68 and Gratz v. Bollinger69 the only post-Bakke cases to consider 
race-preference policies in higher education, the majority “endorse[d] Justice Powell’s view 
that student body diversity is a compelling governmental interest that can justify the use of 
                                                 
65 488 U.S. 469 (1989) 
66 City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 497 (1989) (citing Bakke,438 U.S. at 308-09 (Powell, J.)). 
67 Id. at 499. 
68 359 U.S. 306(2003) 
69 359 U.S. 244 (2003) 
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race in university admissions.”70  Relying on Justice Powell’s words the Grutter Court upheld 
the University Michigan School of Law admissions policies. The Court would have upheld 
the University of Michigan School of Liberal Arts and Sciences Policy had it been narrowly 
tailored. Both schools’ policies supported the constitutionally recognized compelling 
governmental interest in attaining a diverse student body.71  The Court adopted as its own 
Justice Powell’s conclusion that the “nation's future depends upon leaders trained through 
wide exposure to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many 
peoples.” 72   Both “tradition and experience”, Justice O’Connor wrote, lend support to the 
view that the contribution of diversity is substantial.”73   
By 2003 Justice Powell’s majority of one had become, as Justice O’Connor referred to in 
Grutter, “the touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions policies.”74    
Race-preference programs challenged under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment were subject to strict scrutiny review.  Such programs would sustain their 
challenge, however, if the state agency defending the program could prove that race was 
considered as a “plus” and done so in the interest of promoting diversity.  Against this 
landscape of constitutional law the Supreme Court decided Parents Involved. 
                                                 
70 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 268 (2003) (the Court 
rejected the petitioner’s argument that “diversity as a basis for employing racial preferences is simply too open-
ended, ill-defined, and indefinite to constitute a compelling interest capable of supporting narrowly-tailored 
means.”). Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 17-18, 40-41, Gratz v. Bollinger, No. 02-516 (2003).   
71 Id. at 324. 
72 Id. at 324 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313).   
73 Id. at 323. 
74 Grutter v. Bollinger, 538 US 306, 323 (2005) 
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II. THE COURT’S MOST RECENT RACE PREFERENCE CHALLENGES:  MCFARLAND V. 
JEFFERSON COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS 
V. SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT. NO. 1 
 
 
In 2004, parents75 of students enrolled in the Jefferson County Public Schools System 
(Jefferson County) in Kentucky challenged the 2001 Jefferson County school assignment 
plan, which the courts termed the Louisville Plan, as violating the Equal Protection Clause.76   
Jefferson County originally adopted the plan in 1973 in response to the Sixth Circuit 
mandate that they adopt a school board integration plan.77   The plan continued in many 
incarnations until June 2000 when the United States District Court for the Western District 
of Kentucky dissolved the desegregation decree.78  As part of the court’s ruling, Jefferson 
County was ordered to stop using racial quotas and to redesign admission to its magnet 
schools prior to commencement of the 2002-2003 school year.79  In response to the court’s 
order, the school board ended its use of racial quotas80 and after considering public feedback 
                                                 
75 Plaintiff David McFarland filed on behalf on his two sons, Stephen and Daniel; both were denied entry to 
traditional schools.  McFarland v. Jefferson County  Pub. Schs., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 838 n. 3 (W.D. Ky. 2004). 
Plaintiff Ronald Pittenger filed on behalf on his son Brandon, who was denied entry to a traditional school. Id. 
Plaintiff Anthony Underwood filed on behalf of his son Kenneth Maxwell Aubrey, who was denied entry to a 
traditional school. Id. Plaintiff Crystal Meredith filed on behalf of her son Joshua McDonald, who was unable 
to enroll in his resides school because it was filled to capacity; he was assigned to Young school, and applied 
for a transfer to Bloom school that was not in his assigned cluster. Id. He was denied admittance because it 
would have had an adverse effect on the racial composition of the original school he was attending. Id.  The 
Court held that the traditional school selection process was unconstitutional, id. at 838, but because the court 
held that none of the Plaintiffs who were denied entry to the traditional schools had proven they were injured 
by the race selection process, it was only Meredith, whose son was not affected by the traditional schools, who 
appealed. McFarland ex rel. McFarland v. Jefferson County  Pub. Schs., 416 F.3d 513, 514 (6th Cir. 2005).  For 
a general discussion of the Meredith and PICS cases see generally, Garfield, Leslie Yalof,  Adding Colors to the 
Chameleon: Why the Supreme Court May Adopt a New Compelling Governmental Interest Test for Race-
Preference Student Assignment Plans ___ Kan. L. Rev ___ (2007). 
76 McFarland, 330 F.Supp.2d at 836.  
77 Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson County , 489 F.2d  925, 932 (6th Cir. 1973). 
78 Hampton v. Jefferson County  Bd. Of Educ., 102 F. Supp.2d 358, 377-81 (W.D. Ky. 2000). 
79 McFarland, 330 F.Supp.2d at 841. 
80 The Board stopped using quotas at Central High School and at three magnet schools, including DuPont 
Manual High School (which included the Youth Performing Arts School), the Brown School, and Brandeis 
Elementary. Id. The Board concluded that the Court’s order did not include magnet traditional schools. Id. 
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the board adopted the 2001 Plan, the plan that would decide student assignment for the 
2002-2003 school year and beyond.81   
Following the District Court’s decision the school board devised the 2001 plan, with 
the objective of maintaining a fully integrated countywide system of schools.82  To achieve 
that goal, the plan mandated that each school seek a Black student enrollment of at least 
15% and no more than 50%.   Students in the system were permitted to choose the school 
they would like to attend.83  When a particular school was “oversubscribed” the board 
considered a myriad of factors to decide which students should be assigned to that school, 
such as place of residence, school capacity, program popularity.84  If after all other 
considerations, the school remained oversubscribed, the school board composed a random 
draw list from applicants who were arbitrarily sorted into four lists at each grade level as 
                                                 
81 Id.  The stated missions of the 2001 plan is to provide “‘substantial uniform educational resources to all 
students’ and to teach basic skills and critical thinking ‘in a racially integrated environment.’” Id. at 840. 
82 Id. at 847. The 2001 Plan contained three basic organizing principles: (1) management of broad racial 
guidelines, (2) creation of school boundaries or “resides” areas and elementary school clusters, and (3) 
maximization of student choice through magnet schools, magnet traditional schools, magnet and optional 
programs, open enrollment and transfers. Id. 
83  Schools were divided into three types, traditional  magnet schools, non-traditional magnet schools and 
residential type schools called reside schools. Reside schools.  Each Jefferson County school has a “resides 
area”, and, based on the residence of their parent or guardian, each student is assigned to a “resides school”. Id. 
The non-magnet elementary schools are grouped into twelve clusters. Id. Each student has a designated “cluster 
resides schools” which includes the resides school for that students. Id.  The clusters were designed so that they 
would produce populations within the racial guidelines. Id. There are no clusters for the non-magnet middle 
and high schools and each has its own resides area. Id. at 843. The only selection criteria for any student’s 
admission to his or her resides school or a school within the cluster are age, completion of the previous grade, 
and residence. Id. 
   There are nine traditional magnet schools. Id. These schools offer the regular curriculum in a particular 
environment and are not considered resides schools, even though students may only apply to most of the 
schools based on place of residence, because all students must apply to gain admission. Id.  There are four non-
traditional magnet schools. Id. They do not have a resides area, so any student is eligible to apply. Id. These 
schools offer specialized programs and curricula. Id. There are also eighteen magnet programs (small 
specialized programs within regular schools), as well as optional programs in twenty-two schools, (small 
programs with unique attributes). Id. Resides area is not taken into account for these two programs. Id. 
Additionally, there are magnet career academies at the high school level which offer programs concentrated in a 
technical career. Id.  Students must apply to the magnet program at these high schools.  Thirteen are resides 
schools and one is not. Id. 
84 Id.   
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follows: Black Male, Black Female, White Male and White Female.85  Students were selected 
for assignment to a school from each of the four groups depending on demographic need to 
meet the board’s percentage goals.86   
The District Court for the Western District of Kentucky held that the portion of the 
plan that assigned divided applicants to traditional schools by race was unconstitutional 
because it was not narrowly tailored to meet the stated objective of achieving diversity in the 
classroom.87  According to the court Jefferson County could maintain the balance of the 
plan.  Additionally the court ruled that none of the children whose parents challenged the 
2001 Plan were entitled to relief since “equity does not require the Plaintiff’s children be 
admitted to the school of their choice in the upcoming year, and like all other Jefferson 
County students, [plaintiff’s children] may reapply for admission to a traditional school for 
                                                 
85 Once students are selected for the traditional program in kindergarten, they are guaranteed a place in the 
traditional school program for each continuing year, should they choose to elect to remain in the program. Id. 
at 846. These students become the “pipeline” for the program. Id. The pipeline increases each year after 
kindergarten – through the first year of High School. Id. at 846-47. After the schools fill their slots from 
students in the pipeline, the principle has discretion to draw candidates from the different random draw lists to 
fill the additional available slots. Id. at 847. The principal makes his or her selection in a manner that assures the 
school will stay within the racial guidelines for the entire school population. Id. 
86 Id. at 847. The Office of Demographics reviewed the principal’s selection and granted final approval to 
guarantee the school met the Board’s identified racial guidelines If students are not selected for a traditional 
school in one year, they may reapply to try to join the pipeline for the following year. Id. 
87 At the outset, the district court made clear that the 2001 plan was subject to the strict scrutiny standard of 
review. Id. at 848. The court wrote, however, that this case was distinguishable from Grutter and Gratz, but 
applied strict scrutiny none-the less. Id. at 848.  The court recognized that context matters in deciding whether 
Jefferson County identified a compelling governmental interest.  And while the context of public elementary 
and secondary education differs from that of higher education, the court concluded that “the educational 
benefits of a diverse student body” remain the same. Id. at 849 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 
(2003). “The historical importance of the deference accorded to local school boards goes to the heart of our 
democratic form of government.  It is conceptually different, though more accepted than the defense discussed 
in Grutter and Bakke.” McFarland, 330 F.Supp.2d at 850 For this reason, the Court measured the program 
against the analytical framework annunciated in Grutter and Gratz. See, id. at 856, 858.   In evaluating the 
Jefferson County program, however, the Court observed that deference must be granted to local school boards, 
which act in a democratic way to preserve the essence of primary school education, best executed at the local 
level. Id. at 851. The Court ultimately concluded that the 2001 Plan for assigning students to traditional schools 
failed. The plan was not narrowly tailored because “(1) the assignment process put Black and White applicants 
on separate assignment tracks and (2) the use of the separate lists appeared completely unnecessary to 
accomplish the Board’s goals.” Id. at 852, “The process is more like the program that was objectionable in 
affirmative action admission programs of Gratz and Bakke than like the use of race as a tipping factor, which 
the court found permissible in Grutter.” Id.  
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the upcoming academic year.”88 Plaintiff Meredith on behalf of her daughter Crystal 
appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which, per curium, held that the “well reasoned” district court 
opinion should stand.89  
In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,90 the plaintiffs, 
Parents Involved, challenged a city program aimed at achieving diversity in its 10 public high 
schools.  The City of Seattle School District maintained a voluntary open choice policy for 
its 10 high schools.  In the late 1950s’ and early 1960s’ a high school assignment was based 
solely on the students’ residential neighborhood.  Assigning students based on 
neighborhoods resulted in de facto segregation in the schools, and yielded a disproportionate 
mix among African American, Asian American, Latino and Native American students.91   
In an effort to diversify its high schools the Seattle School Board allocated the 
available spaces in its high schools by the individual pupils’ choice.92  A majority of students 
choose the same five schools, and disregarded the remaining high schools in the school 
district. When a school was oversubscribed, the Seattle School Board chose who could 
                                                 
88 Id. at 864. Plaintiff McFarland’s children were enrolled in a traditional school at the time of the ruling, 
making their request for injunctive relief moot. Id. Plaintiffs Pittenger and Underwood have not proved that 
their children were denied admission to a traditional school based solely on their race, nor did their children 
reapply to the traditional program. Id.  
89 McFarland ex rel. McFarland v. Jefferson County  Pub. Schs., 416 F.3d 513, 513 (6th Cir. 2005). 
90 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Disc. No. 1, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (W.D. Wash. 2001), rev’d, 
285 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir. 2002), injunction granted, No. 01-35450, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 7678, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 
26, 2002), reh’g granted, 294 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2002), certifying questions to Washington Supreme Court, 294 F.3d 
1085 (9th Cir. 2002), certified questions answered, 72 P.3d 151 (Wash. 2003), rev’d, 377 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2004), reh’g 
granted en banc, 395 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2005), aff’d, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, No. 05-908, 2006 
U.S. LEXIS 4349, at *1 (June 5, 2006). 
91  See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426 F.3d at 1166.  Approximately 70 percent of Seattle residents are white, 
and approximately 30 percent are nonwhite.  Id.  Seattle’s public school system students are approximately 40 
percent white and 60 percent nonwhite.  Id.  The majority of Seattle’s white public school students live north of 
downtown.  Id.  The majority of Seattle’s nonwhite public school students live south of downtown, including 
approximately 84 percent of all African American students, 74 percent of all Asian American students, 65 
percent of all Latino students, and 51 percent of all Native American students.  Id.  
92 Id. at 1168.  A majority of the city’s nonwhite students live south of downtown, and as a result, the schools 
located in those neighborhoods were disproportionately segregated.   See id. at 1166.  The district responded to 
this because of an historic struggle with racial isolation among its individual neighborhoods.  Id.  Students list 
the high school they would like to attend in order of preference.  Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 137 F. Supp. 2d. 
at 1226. Approximately 82 percent of students entering high school in 2000 selected one of five schools as their 
first choice.  Id. 
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attend that school based on a series of four tie-breakers.93  Parents Involved brought suit 
over the second tie-breaker; the race-preference tie-breaker, 94 which allowed the School 
Board to select students whose race would mitigate the imbalance of the racial make-up of a 
selected school.95   
Parents Involved brought both a state law action and a federal law action in Federal 
District Court claiming that the racial tiebreaker preference violated the Washington Civil 
Rights Act, commonly referred to as Initiative 200, which provided that the state 
government, including school districts, may not discriminate against or grant preferential 
treatment to any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national 
origin in the operation of … public education.96  Parents Involved further claimed that the 
race-preference tiebreaker violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution and Title 
VI of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964.97   
                                                 
93 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426 F.3d at 1169.   
94 The first tiebreaker was the sibling tiebreaker and gave a ninth grader priority to enter a school if he or she 
had a sibling at that school. Id.  Fifteen to 20 percent of admissions to the ninth grade class are a result of the 
sibling tiebreaker.  Id.    
95 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 137 F. Supp. 2d. at 1226. A school is out of balance if it deviates by more than 
15% from the overall racial breakdown of the population of students attending Seattle’s public schools (40% 
white/60% nonwhite). Id. If not for the tiebreaker preference, the school district would be de facto segregated 
due to residential patterns.  See id.  The district estimated that without the racial tiebreaker preference, the 
nonwhite student populations of the 2000-2001 ninth grade class would have been 79.2 percent at Franklin, 
30.5 percent at Hale, 33 percent at Ballard, and 41.1 percent at Roosevelt.  Id.  Utilizing the racial tiebreaker 
preference, the nonwhite student populations for the 2000-2001 ninth grade class were 59.5 percent at 
Franklin, 40.6 percent at Hale, 54.2 percent at Ballard, and 55.3 percent at Roosevelt.  Id.  Approximately 3,000 
students entered Seattle high schools in the 2000-2001 school year, and approximately 300 were assigned to an 
oversubscribed high school as a result of the racial tiebreaker preference.  Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426 F.3d 
at 1170.  In the third tiebreaker, distance of the student’s home to the school is measured, distance is calculated 
within 1/100 of a mile, and the closest students are admitted first.  Id. at 1170.  The distance tiebreaker 
accounts for approximately 70 to 75 percent of ninth grade admissions.  Id.  The fourth tiebreaker utilizes a 
lottery system to allocate the remaining seats.  Id.  The lottery tiebreaker is “virtually never used” since the 
distance tiebreaker assigns nearly all of the students.  Id.  
96 Id. at 1227.  In 1998, Washington voters passed Initiative 200, the Washington Civil Rights Act.  Id.  Initiative 
200 is codified at Washington Revised Code Annotated section 49.60.400.  Id. at 1226.  Section 49.60.400 
declares that “the state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group 
on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public 
education, or public contracting.”  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.400 (West 2006). 
97  Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426 F.3d at 1226. 
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The District Court decided the case in favor of the Seattle School Board on both 
claims.98  Parents Involved appealed the District Court’s decision to grant summary 
judgment, and the Ninth Circuit invalidated the racial tiebreaker preference as a violation of 
Initiative 200.99  Following a subsequent tour through state and federal courts,100  the Court 
of Appeals considered whether the School Board’s use of the race-preference tiebreaker in 
the open choice, non-competitive high school assignment plan violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Constitution.101  The Court found a compelling governmental interest in the 
District’s goals.102  The Court further found that the Program’s use of a raced based tie-
                                                 
98 As to the State claim, the court found “a duty to construe Initiative 200, if possible, in a way that makes the 
initiative consistent with state and federal constitutions.” Id. The authority to use race to provide a “general and 
uniform system of public schools,” interpreted by the courts to mean racially integrated schools, is an authority 
granted by the Washington Constitution. Id. at 1228. Application of Initiative 200 to the tiebreaker preference, 
therefore, would impermissibly effect an amendment to the state constitution. Id. at 1227. The state claim was a 
matter of first impression since Initiative 200 had not yet been construed by the Washington Supreme Court. 
Id.  The Court had to predict how the state’s highest court would apply Initiative 200.  Id. (citing Comm’r v. 
Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967)).  The Court evaluated the federal claim under the strict scrutiny test. 
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426 F.3d at 1232. The Court found as a matter of law a compelling governmental 
interest in “achieving racial diversity and mitigating the effects of de facto residential segregation…” Id. at 1235. 
The Court further held that the racial tiebreaker preference was narrowly tailored. See id. at 1239. The race-
preference tiebreaker only applies to schools deemed out of balance. Id. at 1238. When the entering class of the 
school is balanced, the District abandons the use of race assignments to that school and will not use race to 
assign the remaining spaces in the school. Id. Moreover, the plan is sound since it utilizes a 60/40 plan and 
allows a 15% deviation from those numbers. Id. The Court concluded that the racial tiebreaker passed strict 
scrutiny.  See id. at 1240. 
99 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Disc. No. 1, 285 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir. 2002).  Law codified at 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.400 (West 2006). 
100 Following the Court’s decision to uphold the district plan, Parents Involved in Community Schools 
appealed.  Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 285 F.3d at 1243.  The Court granted an injunction, and the District was 
prohibited from using the racial tiebreaker in making high school assignments.  Id. at 1256.  Applying state law, 
the Court found the tiebreaker violated Washington law. Id. at 1253 (citing § 49.60.400).  Following reversal, 
withdrawal of opinion on grant of rehearing, Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Disc. No. 1, 294 
F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2002), and certification of question to the Supreme Court of Washington, the Supreme 
Court of Washington issued an answer to the certified question. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. 
Disc. No. 1, 72 P.3d 151 (Wash. 2003). .The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with instructions to 
issue an injunction. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Disc. No. 1, 377 F.3d 949, 989 (9th Cir. 
2004).  
101 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426 F.3d at 1166. 
102 Id.  The Court also found a compelling government interest in avoiding the harms that result from racially 
concentrated schools.  Id. at 1180.  In furtherance of that interest, the District is entitled to pursue the benefits 
of racial diversity and avoid the harms of segregation in the absence of a court order deeming it in violation of 
the Constitution.  Id. at 1179.  This entitlement is derived from Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
where the court referenced the voluntary integration of schools as “sound educational policy within the 
discretion of local school officials.”  Id. (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 
(1971)).  
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breaker was narrowly tailored and therefore was constitutionally permissible.103   Parents 
Involved appealed to the Supreme Court.  On June 5, 2006 the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in both cases.104
The Court delivered its opinion on June 28, 2007. At the outset, the Court held that  
both Parents Involved and McFarland presented the identical issue of whether a school board 
could consider race in a voluntary assignment plan absent a court order.105  For this reason, 
the Court chose to decide the cases together.  A very narrow majority of the court voted to 
invalidate each plan.   
 Chief Justice Roberts delivered the “majority” opinion which Justices Alito, Scalia, 
Stevens and Thomas joined.106  Justice Kennedy was the swing vote.  He concurred in the 
                                                 
103 The Court first considered the individualized evaluation of each applicant. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 426 
F.3d at 1180. The Court found that this prong of the test was not totally relevant in the current context since 
there was no competition issue, unlike Grutter and Gratz. See id. More importantly, since race itself is the 
relevant consideration when curing de facto segregation, the tiebreaker preference “must necessarily focus on 
the race of its students.” Id. at 1183 (citing Comfort v. Lynn Sch.Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2005)). For 
these reasons, the district need not conduct an individualized consideration of each student since the plan is 
otherwise narrowly tailored.  See Parents Involved in Cmty.Schs., 426 F.3d at 1183. 
 The Court then turned to the absence of quotas and found that the 15% plus/minus variance is not a 
quota because it does not reserve a fixed number of spots for students based on race. Id. at 1184. The District 
seeks to enroll a critical mass of white/nonwhite students in its oversubscribed schools to reach its compelling 
interests. Id. The 15% plus/minus variance is a goal rather than a rigid ratio. See id. at 1186. The Court found 
that the tiebreaker policy was necessary and the most race neutral alternative since the tiebreaker preference 
allows the realization of the compelling interests and discourages a return to enrollment patterns based on 
racially segregated housing patterns. See id. at 1187. Here, as in Grutter, the Court deferred to the District’s 
judgment in evaluating race neutral alternatives. See id. at 1188.  
 Concerning the fourth prong, the Court found that the policy did not create undue harm because “(1) 
the District is entitled to assign all students to any of its schools, (2) no student is entitled to attend any specific 
school and (3) the tiebreaker does not uniformly benefit any race or group of individuals to the detriment of 
another…” Id. at 1192. Finally, the Court had no issue with the sunset provision that Justice O’Connor, writing 
in Grutter, found essential to the viability of any race-preference policy. See id. In this instance, the District 
reviews the plan annually and is responsive to choice patterns and constituents’ concerns. Id. The Court shares 
O’Connor’s hope in Grutter that in 25 years, racial preferences will no longer be necessary. Id. 
104 Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 126 S.Ct. 2351 (2007). 
105 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 127 S.Ct. 2738.
106 Id. at 2746-68. Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent questioning the need for strict scrutiny. Id. at 2797-
800 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas’ concurrence questioned the dissent’s wisdom as to allowing local 
school boards to define what is compelling. Id. at 2768 (Thomas, J., concurring). In Justice Thomas’ opinion, 
racial imbalance is not the same as segregation and racial imbalance can never justify infringing on the Equal 
Protection Clause. Id. 
 21
judgment but only agreed with part of the plurality’s reasoning.107  Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, 
Stevens and Souter dissented.108   
Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that the strict scrutiny standard that Justice 
Powell initially articulated in Bakke was the appropriate standard for review.109    The Court 
would uphold only the race-preference student assignment plans if each school district could 
show that there was a compelling governmental interest that supported the plan and that the 
plan was narrowly tailored to meet that state’s interest.110   
        The Court considered whether the respondents could demonstrate a compelling 
governmental interest in maintaining their plans.  According to Chief Justice Roberts, 
proponents of the Louisville and Seattle plans would succeed if they could demonstrate that 
their plans met one of the two compelling governmental interests that Justice Powell first 
identified in Bakke;111 that the program was designed to remedy present effects of past 
discrimination and or that the program was created to ensure viewpoint diversity in the 
classroom.  The Chief Justice quickly recognized that the first compelling governmental 
interest was irrelevant in this instance because the plans under consideration were voluntary 
and not created in response to a court order.112  The Court next considered whether the 
plans met the Court’s previously identified interest in achieving viewpoint diversity in 
education.113  The plurality dismissed the compelling governmental interest that Justice 
                                                 
107 Id. at 2789-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
108 Id. at 2800-37 (Breyer, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, J.J., dissenting). 
109 Id. at 2751. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 290; see also supra note 58.  “It is well established that when the government 
distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial classifications, that action is reviewed  
under strict scrutiny” Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 127 S.Ct. at 2751 (citing Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 
505-06 (2005); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 
200, 224 (1995).   
110 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 127 S. Ct. at 2753. 
111 Id. at 2752-53; see also, Adding Colors to the Chameleon: Why the Supreme Court May Adopt a New 
Compelling Governmental Interest Test for Race-Preference Student Assignment Plans.  __ Kan. L. Rev. __ 
(2007). 
112 Id. at 2752. 
113 Id. at 2753; see also, Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312. 
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Powell first stated in Bakke as inapplicable and asserted that the considerations first raised in 
Bakke and reaffirmed in Grutter and Gratz were unique to “institutions of higher 
education.”114   
The plurality rejected the school board’s argument that a compelling governmental 
interest exists in achieving racial balance. According to the school boards, educational and 
broader socialization benefits flow from a racially diverse learning environment.115  In 
response to the school boards’ arguments the plurality found that “the Constitution is not 
violated by racial imbalance in the schools, without more.”116  Any continued use of race, the 
Chief Justice wrote, must be justified on some other basis.117  “Allowing racial balancing as a 
compelling end in itself would effectively assur[e] that race will always be relevant in 
American life, and that the ‘ultimate goal’ of eliminating entirely from governmental decision 
making such irrelevant factors as a human being’s race’ will never be achieved.”118  
Justice Kennedy joined the plurality in its conclusion that the Louisville and Seattle 
programs were not narrowly tailored to meet their identified goals.119  The Jefferson County 
Board considered applicants merely in terms of black/white while the Seattle School Board 
                                                 
114 Id. at 2754 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329).The Court found that Grutter only applied to institutions of higher 
education and distinguished institutions of higher education from other educational facilities, stating that “in 
light of ‘the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university environment, universities 
occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition.’” Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 127 S. Ct. at 2754 (citing 
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329).    
115 See generally transcript of Oral Argument, Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 127 S.Ct. 2738 (Nos. 05-908, 05-915); 
transcript of Oral Argument, Meredith, 127 S.Ct. 2738 (Nos. 05-908, 05-915). 
116 Id. at 2752 (quoting Milliken v, Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 n. 14).   
117 Id. at 2770 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas in his concurrence spent a considerable time on racial 
imbalance. “Racial imbalance is not segregation. Although presently observed racial imbalance might result 
from past de jure segregation, racial imbalance can also result from any number of innocent private decisions, 
including voluntary housing choices.” Id. at 2769 (citing Swann, 402 U.S. 1, 25-26; Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 
70, 116 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). “Because racial imbalance is not inevitably linked to unconstitutional 
segregation, it is not unconstitutional in and of itself.” Parents Invovled in Cmty. Schs., 127 S.Ct. at 2769 (citing 
Dayton Bd. of Ed. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 413 (1977); Dayton Bd. of Ed. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 531 n. 
5 (1979) (“Racial imbalance…is not per se a constitutional violation”); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 
(1992); Swann, 402 U.S. at 31-32; cf. Millikan, 418 U.S. at 740-41 and n. 19 (Thomas J., concurring)).
118 Id.at 2758 (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 495 (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 320)). 
119 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 127 S. Ct. at 2790-91 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
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considered applications in terms of nonwhite/white.120  In each instance the plans were 
drafted based on widely-drawn categories of specific races and ethnicities.  Each school 
boards’ practices did not fit within the Bakke construct which promoted “a far broader array 
of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though 
important element.”121  Justice Kennedy’s concurrence provided the fifth vote to invalidate 
both the Louisville and the Seattle programs. 
 Justice Kennedy began his concurrence by agreeing with the plurality that strict 
scrutiny was the appropriate standard for reviewing the Court’s decision.122  He joined the 
plurality in concluding that the programs were not narrowly tailored and for that reason, he 
agreed to invalidate both the Seattle and the Louisville plans.123  Justice Kennedy did not 
agree with the plurality’s assessment which stated that diversity in education is not a 
compelling governmental interest and wrote that “diversity, depending on its meaning and 
definition, is a compelling educational goal a school district may pursue.”124    
 In Justice Kennedy’s opinion the plurality opinion was far too restrictive since it 
seemed to limit a government’s right to use race to instances of de jure segregation.125    In 
Justice Kennedy’s view the plurality was “…too dismissive of the legitimate interest 
government has in ensuring all people have equal opportunity regardless of their race.”126  
The plurality’s decision to reject a compelling governmental interest in creating viewpoint 
diversity in grades K-12 meant that school boards were prohibited from taking steps to 
                                                 
120 Id. at 2746 (majority opinion) 
121 Id. at 2753 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325). 
122 Id. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
123 Id. at 2790-91.   
124 Id. at 2789. 
125 Id. at 2789. “The plurality is open to the interpretation that the Constitution requires school districts to 
ignore the problem of de facto segregation in schooling.” Id.  
126 Id. at 2791.  
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insure integration absent a showing that the state had previously engaged in intentional 
school segregation.   
According to Justice Kennedy, the plurality was “profoundly mistaken,”127 in its 
conclusion that “the Constitution mandates that state and local school authorities must 
accept the status quo of racial isolation in schools.  .  .  .”128   In his opinion, “[t]his Nation 
has a moral and ethical obligation to fulfill its historic commitment to creating an integrated 
society that ensures equal opportunity for all its children.”129  A compelling interest exists in 
avoiding racial isolation - an interest that a school district in its discretion and expertise may 
choose to pursue.130  A compelling interest exists also in achieving a diverse student 
population and school boards may consider race as “…one component of that diversity, but 
other demographic factors, plus special talents and needs, should also be considered.”131  
Ultimately, Justice Kennedy concluded that the decision should not prevent school districts 
from continuing the important work of bringing together students of different racial ethnic 
and economic backgrounds. “Due to a variety of factors…neighborhoods in our 
communities do not reflect the diversity of our Nation as a whole.”132 Although Justice 
Kennedy found a compelling governmental interest, he voted to legalize the programs 
because the school boards did not demonstrate that their approaches were the only means of 
avoiding racial isolationism.133    
In his dissent Justice Breyer joined by Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg wrote 
that both the Louisville and Seattle race-conscious school board plans withstood the 
longstanding Court-mandated test of strict scrutiny.  Both plans served a compelling 
                                                 
127 Id.   
128 Id.   
129 Id. at 2797. 
130 Id. 
131 Id.  
132 Id.  
133 Id. at 2790-91.  
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governmental interest and were narrowly tailored.134   For these reasons the dissenting 
justices would have voted to uphold the plans.135    
 Justice Breyer described the “compelling interest” in the Louisville and Seattle plans 
as “the school districts’ interest in eliminating school-by-school racial isolation and 
increasing the degree to which racial mixture characterizes each of the district’s schools and 
each individual student’s public school experience.”136  He noted that this compelling 
interest possesses three essential elements: “the historical and remedial element of rectifying 
consequences of prior segregation; the educational element of overcoming adverse 
educational effects produced by and associated with highly segregated schools; and the 
democratic element of producing an educational environment that reflects “the ‘pluralistic 
society’ in which our children will live.”137  After considering each element, Justice Breyer 
determined that the districts’ interest in eradicating primary and secondary public school 
school segregation involved all three elements.  He asked rhetorically, “[if] an educational 
interest that combines these three elements is not ‘compelling,’ then what is?”138
 In addition to concluding that the districts’ plans address a compelling interest, 
Justice Breyer also would have found that plans were narrowly tailored.139  The plans limited 
the use of race and also strongly relied on other non-race conscious elements. The history 
and the manner in which the districts developed and modified their approaches further 
supported a finding that they were narrowly tailored. Justice Breyer cited  the fact that each 
school board had devised a plan that imposed a more minimal burden than previously court-
                                                 
134 Id. at 2820 (Breyer, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, J.J., dissenting). Justice Breyer would have used a more 
lenient standard than strict scrutiny since the plans do not result in race based harm, but concluded that the 
plans survived even the strictest of scrutiny. Id. 
135 See generally id. at 2800-37. 
136 Id. at 2820.   
137 Id. at 2820-22, 2821(quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).  
138 Id. at 2823.   
139 Id. at 2825.   
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approved plans and that the school boards had a lack of reasonably evident alternatives as 
support that the racial balancing programs were narrowly tailored.140   
 Justice Breyer disagreed with the plurality’s conclusion that a compelling 
governmental interest in instances other than in higher education is limited to remedying de 
jure rather than de facto segregation.141  He concluded that the distinction is “meaningless in 
the present context.”142  Irrespective of the cause, he pointed out, both school districts were 
“highly segregated in fact” prior to the districts’ desegregation plans and thus were in need 
of a remedy.143   
 Justice Breyer dedicated an entire section of his dissent to a section entitled 
“consequences.”144  “Today’s holding,” he wrote, “upsets settled expectations, creates legal 
uncertainty, and threatens to produce considerable further litigation, aggravating race-related 
conflict.”145  He noted that prior to the present decision “[t]his Court understood the 
Constitution as affording the people, acting through their elected representatives, freedom to 
select the use of race-conscious criteria from among their available options” in order to 
eliminate segregation in schools.146  To invalidate plans that incorporate such criteria, he 
asserted, would “threaten the promise of Brown.”147  Therefore, he concluded, “[t]his is a 
decision that the Court and the Nation will come to regret.”148
                                                 
140 Id. at 2829-30.   
141 Id. at 2802, 2810.   
142 Id. at 2802.   
143 Id. at 2802. The plurality counters that the dissent “elides this distinction between de jure and de facto 
segregation” and that the distinction between segregation by state action and racial imbalance caused by other 
factors “has been central to our jurisprudence in this area for generations” Id. at 2761 (majority opinion) (citing 
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 n. 14 (1977). In the present cases, argues the plurality, race-conscious 
remedies were inappropriate because the Seattle school district never was segregated by law and the Louisville 
district had previously been deemed “unitary” by a federal court.  Id. at 2761.   
144 See id. at 2831-34 (Breyer, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg J.J. dissenting). 
145 Id. at 2836.  
146 Id. at 2834. 
147 Id. at 2837. 
148 Id. The plurality claims that Justice Breyer’s concerns regarding the ramifications of its decision exhibit “an 
unjustified note of alarm.” Id. at 2766.  (majority opinion). Regarding the various laws the dissent cites as now 
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The fractionalized plurality of Parents Involved was unwilling to support programs 
aimed at maintaining school integration goals that civil rights founders fought so hard to 
achieve.  The Louisville and Seattle plans reflected the ways in which school boards across 
the country responded to the Court’s ruling in Brown v. Board of Education.149   Now that these 
programs have achieved their goals of racial balance, they face the same fate as the Louisville 
and Seattle plans.  As a consequence, the decision of the four justice plurality coupled with 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence has, in the words of Justice Ginsburg, made something that is 
“constitutionally required one day, constitutionally prohibited the next day?”150   
 
III.  THE FUTURE OF RACE-PREFERENCE POLICIES POST-PARENTS INVOLVED. 
 
 
A. THE VALUE OF JUSTICE KENNEDY’S CONCURRENCE 
 
 
The way in which the justices divided their votes in Parents Involved is strikingly similar 
to the Bakke decision.  In each case four justices voted that there was no room in the law to 
allow for a race-preference policy that favored one group based on race or ethnicity.151  Four 
other justices found that the race-preference policies designed to create viewpoint diversity 
in grades K-12 fit squarely within the Constitutional limits of the law.152  One Justice in each 
case cast a “swing vote” holding that there is a compelling governmental interest in creating 
viewpoint diversity in the classroom.  The manner in which the University of California, 
                                                                                                                                                 
vulnerable, the plurality says that they “have nothing to do with the pertinent issues” presently before the court. 
Id. at 2766. 
149 Id. at 2767. 
150 Adam Liptak, Brown v. Board of Education, Second Round, NY TIMES, Dec. 10, 2006 (quoting Justice Ginsburg 
in Oral Arguments for the Meredith case).   
151 See supra pp 2-4. 
152 Id.   
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Seattle and Louisville plans were adopted, however, were not the most narrowly tailored to 
meet a constituently permissible goal. 153   
 Justice Kennedy’s swing vote has the potential to offer race-preference program 
advocates the hope that their challenged programs would survive strict scrutiny. Even such 
tenuous “majorities of one” like Justice Powell’s plurality opinion in Bakke are questionable 
for their precedential weight.154  Arguably concurrences offer less value.  Supreme Court 
jurisprudence illustrates, however, even concurring opinions can serve as precedent for 
future decisions.155  
Several well-recognized concurrences have formed the basis for future judicial 
decisions. Justice Brandeis’ concurrence in Whitney v. California156  became the basis for the 
“imminent harm” prong of Brandenburg v. Ohio.157 Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown 
Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer158 laid the foundation for assessing the constitutionality of 
                                                 
153 Charles Lane, Kennedy Seen as The Next Justice In Court's Middle: Alito Expected to Tilt Conservative, WASHINGTON 
POST, Jan. 31, 2006, at A04; Billy House, Kennedy is Court’s New Swing Vote, REPUBLIC, Jul. 2, 2006; Andrew 
Cohen, The Court’s ‘Swing Vote’ Finally Swings Again, Washingtonpost.com Blog, June 28, 2007. 
153 See Laura K. Ray, The Justices Write Separately: Uses of the Concurrence by the Rehnquist Court, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 777, 780 (1990).  
154 “In the wake of our fractured decision in Bakke, courts have struggled to discern whether Justice Powell's 
diversity rationale, set forth in part of the opinion joined by no other Justice, is nonetheless binding precedent  
under Marks.  In that case, we explained that ‘[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale 
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position 
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.’” Grutter., 539 U.S. at 325 
(quoting Marks v. U.S., 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
155 See generally, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San  Antonio 
Metro Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985); United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969); 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); see also generally, Igor Kirman, Standing Apart to Be a Part: The 
Precendential Value of Supreme Court Concurring Opinions, 95 COLUM. L.  REV. 2083 (1995). 
156 274 U.S. 357 (1927).   
157 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
158 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Youngstown considered whether President Truman exceeded his Constitutional powers 
when he ordered the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of and operate most of the Nation’s steel mills 
in order to avoid a nationwide strike during the Korean conflict. Justice Black delivered the opinion for the 
Majority of the Court, holding that that President Truman had usurped Congress’s power when he ordered the 
seizure of the steel mills. It was Justice Jackson’s concurrence, however, that was most widely relied upon by 
future courts. In his concurrence, Justice Jackson formulated the following tripartite framework for assessing 
the constitutionality of executive action:  1) when a President acts within the express or implied authorization 
of Congress, his authority is “at its maximum;” 2) when a President acts in absence of Congressional grant or 
denial of authority, he operates in a “zone of twilight” in which he and Congress may have concurrent 
authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain; and 3) when a President takes measures incompatible with 
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executive actions and Justice Stewart’s concurrence in Jacobellis v. Ohio159 where he said of 
obscenity, “I know it when I see it”160 has become one of the most oft-quoted lines of the 
Court. 161
Concurring opinions have often exercised a greater impact on subsequent cases than the 
majority opinions that they accompany.162  Justice Kozinski of the 9th Circuit has said “a 
                                                                                                                                                 
the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at “its lowest ebb.” Id. at 635-37 (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
159 378 U.S. 184 (1964).  
160 Id. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
161 In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, where the Court held that the Presidential Recordings and 
Materials Preservation Act did not violate principle of separation of powers, Justice Brennan wrote that the 
Court “embraced Mr. Justice Jackson’s view, expressed in his concurrence in [Youngstown].” Nixon v. 
Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977). 
    Several years later, in Dames & Moore v. Regan, Justice Rehnquist, writing the Majority opinion, observed the 
longstanding influence of Justice Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence, finding  “Justice Jackson’s classification 
of executive actions … analytically useful.” Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981). 
    Justice Harlan’s concurrences in both Katz v. United States and Terry v. Ohio have also eclipsed the majority 
decisions and served to support future Court decisions.  In Katz,, Justice Stewart wrote the Majority opinion.  
Justice Black dissented. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The Court 
held that government authorities erred when they engaged in electronic surveillance of an individual’s 
telephone booth conversations without gaining advance authorization by a magistrate upon a showing of 
probable cause. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967). As a result, the authorities engaged in 
unreasonable search and seizure under the 4th Amendment. In his Katz concurrence, Justice Harlan articulated 
the rule that a person is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection of privacy if he exhibits an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy, and  the expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
    The Court explicitly embraced Harlan’s Katz test in subsequent decisions.  As a result, Justice Harlan’s Katz 
test has gained “a persuasive hold over search doctrine” on courts’ evaluation of search and seizure challenges. 
Major Eric R. Carpenter, Seizures without Searches: Defining Property Seizures and Developing a Property Seizure Model, 42 
GONZ. L. REV. 173, 202 n. 244 (2006-07). See Meghan J. Ryan, Does Stare Decisis Apply in the Eighth Amendment 
Death Penalty Context?, 85 N.C. L. REV. 847; Bridget C.E. Dooling, Take It Past the Limit: Regulatory Takings of 
Personal Property,  16 FED. CIR. B. J. 445 (2007); but see Matthew D. Lawless, The Third Part Doctrine Redux: Internet 
Search Records and the Case for a ‘Crazy Quilt’ of Fourth Amendment Protection, 2007 U.C.L.A. J. L. & TECH. 1, 41 n. 
95 (2007) (quoting Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (“The Katz test -- whether the individual has an 
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable -- has often been criticized as circular, 
and hence subjective and unpredictable.”); see also 1 Wayne R.LaFave, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.1(d), at 393-94 (3d ed. 1996). 
    One year after Katz, Justice Harlan wrote another concurrence that even further shaped Fourth Amendment 
Law. In Terry v. Ohio, the court found a police officer did not exceed the reasonable scope of a search when he 
had reason to believe that the defendant was contemplating a daytime robbery. 392 U.S.1, 30-31 (1968) 
(Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan’s concurrence defined for future courts the appropriate inquiry courts 
should make when determining what makes a frisk reasonable. See, e.g., U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 
(1980) (the Court cited Justice Harlan’s Terry concurrence in holding that police officers enjoy the “liberty …to 
address questions to other persons” but also that “the person addressed has an equal right to ignore his 
interrogator and walk away”); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983) (the Court relied on Justice 
Harlan’s Terry concurrence to support the proposal that, while a police officer is entitled to approach a citizen, 
the citizen “may decline to listen to the questions…and go on his way”);  U.S. v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 
(1983) (the Court explicitly adopted Justice Harlan’s rule, stating, “[i]n his concurring opinion in Terry, Justice 
Harlan made this logical underpinning of the Court’s Fourth Amendment holding clear…the right to frisk in 
this case depends upon the reasonableness of a forcible stop to investigate a suspected crime”). 
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concurring opinion can be influential, especially when authored by a swing justice.”163  
“When the concurring Justice is necessary to effect a majority, a simple concurrence often 
represents a concession, in the absence of which the case would be decided differently.”164  
In National League of Cities v. Usery, four members of the Court found unconstitutional “…any 
federal law that ‘directly displace[s] the States’ freedom to structure integral operations in 
areas of traditional government functions...’”165 Justice Blackman, concurred with the 
plurality, which made enough votes to strike down the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor 
Standards Act.  His concurrence included a balancing test which future courts adopted as the 
means for evaluating when a federal interest may justify state compliance.166
 Concurrences are most forceful when the concurring opinion offers a clear formulation 
for future evaluation or defines a standard by which future courts can evaluate a particular 
challenge.   Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet and Tube and Justice Harlan’s 
concurrence in Terry v. Ohio provided future courts with “tests” to apply when considering 
constitutional challenges.   Justice Powell’s language in Bakke, that state programs based on 
race must be “precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest”167 served as the 
foundation for the strict scrutiny test.168  Similarly, Justice Kennedy’s swing vote offers a 
prescription for future race-preference challenges.   
 In Parents Involved Justice Kennedy defined a compelling governmental to include 
promotion of view point diversity at every educational level.  School districts are free to 
                                                                                                                                                 
162 See generally, Kirman, supra note 157. 
163 Id.  
164 Id.  
165 National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852.  See also Kirman, supra note 157. 
166 See Id.  National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The Fair Labor Standards Act of 
1974 extended “minimum wage and maximum hour provisions” to most state and local government 
employees. See id. at 836 (majority opinion).  
167 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299. 
168 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. 
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employ programs that will avoid the “status quo.”169    His assertion that the Constitution 
does not prohibit K-12 level school authorities from taking affirmative measures to prevent 
racial imbalance extends the Bakke/Grutter context beyond higher education.  Consequently, 
his clear formulation of the appropriate instances in which courts may find a state agency has 
met its burden of showing a compelling governmental interest provides future courts with 
the ability to uphold race-preference challenges beyond those limited to higher education.170    
Justice Kennedy’s opinion also identifies the right instances in which race-conscious 
measures can be constitutionally devised.171  School boards may not assign a student to a 
particular school based solely on his race or ethnicity, they may, however, use performance 
and other statistics, demographic zoning and enrollment tracking to support race-preference 
programs.  School boards have the power to create magnate schools or may draw school 
zones with living patterns in mind.172   The alternatives available to school boards suggest 
that creative tailoring leave open the opportunity for schools to avoid a retreat to segregated 
schools systems.  
Justice Kennedy’s opinion makes clear that there is a compelling governmental 
interest in remedying de facto segregation in instances other than achieving diversity 
jurisdiction in higher education.  Governmental entities need not demonstrate that they were 
somehow instrumental in creating the segregation before they are constitutionally permitted 
                                                 
169 See Parents Involved 127 S.Ct. at 2791. 
170 See Tony Mauro, Court Strikes Plans That Assign Students Based on Their Race, NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL, June 
29, 2007.  “‘The more we look at Justice Kennedy's opinion, the more clear it is that there is an opening’ for 
continuing efforts to prevent the resegregation of schools, said Theodore Shaw, president of the NAACP Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund. He was in the courtroom as the decision was announced, just as Thurgood 
Marshall, his long-ago predecessor, was in the courtroom when Brown v. Board of Education was announced in 
1954.” Id. 
171 See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
172 Commentators argue that the limited methods of which Justice Kennedy approves will not effectively meet 
the needs demanded by affirmative action proponents.  See e.g., Glater and Finder, supra note 10.  
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to dismantle it.  The attainment of viewpoint diversity, in the right instances, is sufficient to 
support district wide school assignment plans.  
 
B. THE AFTERMATH OF JUSTICE KENNEDY’S CONCURRENCE 
 
Justice Kennedy’s vote in Parents Involved is emblematic of his role as “middle man” on 
the bench during the 2006-2007 term.  Decisions during the Court’s 2006-2007 term were 
among the most conservative the nation has seen in a long while.  The vacancy left by the 
politically moderate Sandra Day O’Connor coupled with President Bush’s 2006 
appointments of Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito prompted a clear shift 
toward a more conservative ideology.173   
Justice Kennedy’s moderate alliance with the right has limited the shift from its 
potentially seismic proportions.  In several cases, Parents Involved  among them, Kennedy’s 
vote tipped the 5-4 balance in favor of a retreat from pro-liberal stances.  In Gonzales v. 
Carhart, for example, justices in the Parents Involved majority voted to uphold a federal law 
banning middle to late trimester abortions.174  Justice Kennedy provided the swing vote in 
this case which reversed the Court’s six-year old ruling that struck down a similar law in 
Nebraska.175  In Morse v. Frederick, a case that considered a high school student’s right to 
                                                 
173 See Adam Cohen, Editorial Observer - Last Term’s Winner at the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism, NEW YORK 
TIMES, July 9, 2007;  Linda Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved Right, NEW YORK TIMES 
July 1, 2007; Nina Totenberg, A Newly Conservative Supreme Court, NPR NEWS, Oct. 2, 2006;  See also, Bill Mears, 
5-4 votes nudge Supreme Court to the right - CNN.com 
http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/law/07/02/scotus.review/index.html "This has been the most 
overwhelmingly, consistently conservative term of the Supreme Court in recent memory," (quoting Prof.  
Erwin Chemerinsky, constitutional scholar at Duke University's law school.) Id.  
 
174 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S.Ct. 1610, 1619 (2007).   
175 Congress passed the Act at issue in Gonzales to respond to the Stenberg decision, which held that a Nebraska 
law that banned partial birth abortion was unconstitutional. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 929-30 (2000).  
Justice Ginsberg gave a bitter dissent in this case.  “The Court's hostility to the right Roe and Casey secured is 
not concealed. Throughout, the opinion refers to obstetrician-gynecologists and surgeons who perform 
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display a banner reading “Bong Hits 4 Jesus,” the same 5 conservative justices concluded 
that the First Amendment right to free does not extend to speech about drugs.176    
While the 2006-2007 term’s conservative opinions threaten to limit previously granted 
individual and civil rights, history makes clear that the law is static and that a change in the 
make-up of the bench by even one justice can offer a new position on an old decision.177  
Often justices use the language of a particular case to jettison the law in a new direction.178  
Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke is an example of where the language from a decision 
limiting the rights to achieve a liberal goal served to guarantee racial diversity programs 
under future decisions.179  To the extent that a less conservative bench decides future cases 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence offers optimistic hope to a pessimistic situation.180
The law on the use of race-preference policies prior to Parents Involved was relatively clear.   
The Court would find a compelling governmental interest in remedying present effects of 
past discrimination in the workplace181 and in achieving diversity in higher education.182  Five 
of the justices deciding Parents Involved  identified a compelling governmental interest beyond 
those the Court had previously stated.  The dissenting and Justice Kennedy agreed that the 
compelling governmental interest in achieving viewpoint diversity extends to classrooms in 
grades K-12. 
                                                                                                                                                 
abortions not by the titles of their medical specialties, but by the pejorative label ‘abortion doctor.’  A fetus is 
described as an ‘unborn child,’ and as a ‘baby,’; second-trimester, previability abortions are referred to as ‘late-
term,’; and the reasoned medical judgments of highly trained doctors are dismissed as ‘preferences’ motivated 
by ‘mere convenience,’.” See Gonzales, 127 S.Ct. at 1650 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).  
176 See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S.Ct. 2618, 2626 (2007).  At a school event, the principal observed students 
display a sign promoting the use of illicit drugs.  The principal told the students to take the banner down. The 
Court ruled that the school principal acted reasonably when she tore down the students sign and suspended the 
student.  See id. at 2622. 
177 Compare, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) with Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
178 See generally Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring). 
179 See supra Part I B and note 111.   
180 See supra note 147. 
181 See supra text accompanying notes 42-66. 
182 See supra note 72. 
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 The plurality and dissent were clearly at odds as to the role racial consciousness 
should play in American life.  According to the plurality, upholding the school board plans 
would perpetuate the use of race in the governmental decision making process.183  In their 
opinion governments may not use race except in the most specific instances of rectifying de 
jure segregation.184  To allow the use non-neutral policies beyond the strictest limitations 
would encourage society to continue looking at individuals based on race.  In their mind 
America will not become a truly integrated society until governments are prohibited from 
taking race or ethnicity into account. 185
The dissent found a compelling governmental interest in ending racial isolation 
regardless of whether it was created de facto or de jure.  The “democratic element of producing 
an educational environment that reflects a pluralistic society” remained a paramount goal.186  
The four justices suggested that there is a compelling governmental interest in creating racial 
                                                 
183 See supra text accompanying notes 107-23. 
184 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.  
185  It is not likely that the Court would extend the permissible instances of using race-preference policies in the 
workplace beyond proof of present effect of past discrimination.  The Third Circuit recently considered 
whether there was a compelling governmental interest in achieving racial balancing in the work place absent a 
demonstrated instance of de jure segregation. In Lomack v. City of Newark, 463 F.3d. 303 (3rd Cir. 2006), the Third 
Circuit heard a challenge that fire fighters brought against a mayoral initiative that abolished single-race fire 
companies.  In 2002 then Mayor Sharpe James announced his own personal “mandate” to improve morale by 
transferring firefighters based on race.  The Firefighters filed suit in federal district court challenging the case 
under the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII. Following a bench trial the district court found for the city.  
The firefighters appealed to the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit considered the issue of whether the City of 
Newark could employ a race-based transfer policy when current racial imbalance was not the result of past 
intentional discrimination on the part of the city. 463 F.3d at 305. The court reviewed the Mayor’s policy under 
strict scrutiny and ultimately found that the city did not meet its burden of proof. When charged with 
defending its plan the City advocated three compelling governmental interests that justified considering race 
when assigning firefighters to a particular fire company; eliminating de facto segregation in the fire department, 
securing the educational, sociological and job performance benefits that would arise from having a diverse fire 
company and responding to the 1980 consent decree. Id. at 307.  The court rejected the city’s first argument 
and wrote that remedial justification was “wholly inapplicable’ where a governmental entity did not 
intentionally cause the discrimination currently sought to be redressed. Id. The city also argued that as a 
governmental entity, it had a compelling interest in correcting de facto segregation.  The court rejected this 
argument, finding that “[w]hile the elimination of de facto segregation is a laudable goal, doing so does not 
constitute a compelling governmental interest that can be achieved by means of racial classification.” Id. The 
court termed the policy as racial balancing and found that racial balancing may never be achieved for its own 
sake.   
186 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 127 S.Ct. at 2821 (Breyer, Stevens Souter, Ginsberg, J.J. dissenting)(citing 
Swann v. Mecklenberg, 402 U.S. at 16). See also, supra note 139 and accompanying text.  
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diversity even beyond the classroom, thereby asserting the need to assure governments the 
opportunity to redress instances of segregation regardless of how they arise.187
Justice Kennedy agreed with the dissent that the Constitution permits governments 
to fashion remedies aimed at eliminating de facto segregation as a means of confronting the 
flaws and injustices that remain from the vestiges of a segregated society.188  In Justice 
Kennedy’s mind, today’s neighborhoods do not reflect diversity as a whole and absent the 
use of limited race-conscious measures this country may never achieve its goal of making 
race irrelevant in every day life.  For this reason, Justice Kennedy concluded that there is a 
“legitimate interest in ensuring the all people have an equal opportunity based on race.”   
Justice Kennedy’s language stating that “diversity, depending on its meaning and 
definition, is a compelling educational goal a school district may pursue” offers the type of 
formulation on which future courts can rely when considering race-preference challenges in 
instances other than higher education.  In Bakke, Justice Powell’s words that “the attainment 
of a diverse student body . . . is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher 
education,”189 served as a means by which courts could uphold race preference policies. 
Justice Kennedy’s words provide a similarly clear and articulated instance when a 
government can take race into account beyond the scope of what is currently permissible.  A 
court adopting the language of his concurrence will help to expand the scope of 
constitutionally permissible instances of the use of race beyond the Court’s current 
definition. 
                                                 
187 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 127 S.Ct.  at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) “Our Nation from the inception has sought to preserve and expand the promise of liberty and 
equality on which it was founded. Today we enjoy a society that is remarkable in its openness and opportunity. 
Yet our tradition is to go beyond present achievements, however significant, and to recognize and confront the 
flaws and injustices that remain.”  
188 Id.  
189 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12. 
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The fact that Justice Kennedy’s language can broaden the definition of a compelling 
governmental interest beyond higher education is cause for celebration, but it does not 
assure that States will remain free to enact race-preference policies to attain viewpoint 
diversity.190  States defending their programs must pass the “narrowly tailored’ prong of the 
compelling governmental interest test.  Few governmental entities have been able to prove 
their programs are narrowly tailored, hence the reason it is considered the fatal prong of the 
strict scrutiny test.191    In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy provided solid guidelines for 
school boards interested in using race in a constitutionally permissible manner “including 
strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with general recognition of 
the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special programs; recruiting 
students and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other 
statistics by race.”192  The guidelines are helpful, but they are also limiting, far beyond the 
traditional consideration of evaluating individual students based on race, ethnicity and other 
personal attributes.193  
State voters can also put their own limitation on the use of race-preference policies.  
In November, 2006 Michigan adopted Proposal 2, which prohibited state agencies, including 
state universities from using “discrimination or preferential treatment based on race or 
                                                 
190 See supra noted 53-66 and accompanying text. 
191 See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (Policy assigning points to University applicants based on, 
among other things, race, was not narrowly tailored); City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 
(1989) (Municipal set-aside program awarding contracts to minority construction companies was not narrowly 
tailored); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality opinion) (Policy reserving space for 
minority applicants to Univ. of California Medical School not narrowly tailored). The strict scrutiny test has 
been “described as strict in theory and fatal in fact” in part because of the rigorous application of the narrowly 
tailored prong.  See, Tonja Jacobi, Legal Doctrine and Political Control, 23 J. L. Econ & Org. 326 (2007) 
(quoting Kathleen M. Sullivan & Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 772-73 (15th ed. 2004).
192 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 127 S.Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (citing Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958 (1986)). 
193See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336-37 (finding that race may be used as a “plus” so long as it is not the “defining 
feature” of a particular individual’s application) (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318 n. 52).    
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gender.”194  The issue as to whether the voters could prohibit race-preference policies by 
referendum was challenged in the courts.   
The Michigan referendum required that Proposal 2 take effect beginning December 
23, 2006, which fell in the middle of college recruiting and admission season.195  The state’s 
public universities, in an action titled Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm,196 filed a 
motion in the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan requesting a temporary 
stay allowing them to “continue to use their existing admissions policies thru the end of the 
current admissions cycle.”197  The District Court granted the universities’ request.  The 
schools were free to keep their diversity admissions plans in tact.  
Eric Russell, a white male, filed suit to stay the district Court’s decision.198   The 
district court did not act swiftly and Russell appealed to the Sixth Circuit for an emergency 
stay and a Writ of Mandamus to allow him to join in the suit.199    The Sixth Circuit panel 
granted Russell’s emergency motion for a stay since he was likely to prevail on the merits.200  
Writing for the Court, Judge Sutton concluded that the Constitution did not prohibit states 
from banning the use of race preference policies in admissions.  The Equal Protection 
                                                 
194  Proposal 06-2 reads: 
A ban on public institutions from using affirmative action programs that give preferential treatment to 
groups or individuals based on their race, gender, color, ethnicity or national origin for public 
employment educational or contracting purposes.  Public institutions affected by the proposal include 
state government, local governments, public colleges and universities, community colleges and public 
schools. 
Prohibit public institutions from discriminating against groups or individuals based on race, gender, 
color ethnicity or national origin. 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/Statewide_Bal_Prop_Status_145801_7.pdf 
195 Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 473 F.3d 237 (6th Cir. 2006). 
196 473 F3d 237 (6th Cir. 2006) 
197 Id. at 239. 
198 Id.  The group Toward a Fair Michigan joined in the action. Id. at 242.  
199 Id. at 243. While Russell was awaiting relief from the Sixth Circuit, the district court granted his motion to 
intervene. Id.  
200 Id. at 244. In reviewing a motion for stay pending appeal, the appellate court considers: (1) the likelihood 
that the moving party will prevail on the merits of the appeal, (2) the likelihood that the moving party will be 
irreparably harmed absent a stay, (3) the prospect that others will be harmed if the court grants the stay, and (4) 
the public interest in granting the stay. Id.
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Clause does not permit “official conduct aimed at discriminating on the basis of race,”201  
nor does it compel states to take measures to ensure racial diversity.202  Referring to the strict 
scrutiny test Judge Sutton observed that the constitution never compels states to do that 
which “they narrowly may do.”203  For this reason, laws that ban the use of race-preference 
polices do not deny citizens equal protection under the law.204   Since it was likely that 
Russell would prevail on the merits, the Sixth Circuit granted Russell’s motion for a stay.  
Proposal 2 went into effect on December 23, 2006.205  While schools scramble to comply 
with the constitutional referendum,206 the parties continue to litigate the issue on the 
merits.207  
Justice Kennedy would extend the Bakke and Grutter rulings to all educational 
institutions.  His concurrence, coupled with members of the dissent, equals five justices on 
the current Court who would find a compelling governmental interest in ensuring against a 
return to segregated classrooms.   Parents Involved, like Bakke, is likely to serve as an instance 
where a negative decision results in a positive outcome for proponents of race-preference 
policies.   
 
                                                 
201 Id. at 248. 
202 Id.  In response to the Sixth Circuit decision, the universities filed a motion to the Supreme Court to vacate 
the stay.  On January 17, 2007, Justice Stevens denied the motion.  Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. 
Granholm, 127 S.Ct. 1146, 166 L.Ed.2d 909, 75 USLW 3429 (U.S. Jan 19, 2007) (NO. 06A678) 
203 Id. at 249. 
204 Id. at 250 quoting Coal. For Econ. Equity, 122 F3d  692, 708 (9th Cir. 1997) at 708.   
205  Diversity and Inclusion at Michigan State University,  
http://president.msu.edu/prop2response/faqs/index.php.     In accordance with the Michigan Constitution, all 
amendments go into effect 45 days after the election. Mich. Const. art. XII, §2.
206 Kristi Jourdan, MSU Readies for Prop. 2’s Effect – Federal Court Forcing Universities to Abide by Ban Immediately, 
The State News, Jan. 8, 2007, available at 
http://www.statenews.com/index.php/article/2007/01/msu_readies_for_prop. 
207 See, Operation King’s Dream v. Connerly, 2007 WL 2416815 (6th cir. 2007); Action, Integration and 
Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equality By any Means Necessary (BAMN) v. Granholm,  2007 WL 2492975 
(6th Cir. 2007) C.A.6 (Mich.),2007.  “Plaintiffs assert that Prop. 2 was intended to and will resegregate the most 
selective Universities in the state.” Id.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The Parents Involved plurality limited the instance where a governmental entity could 
devise a constitutionally permissible race-preference program to instances of de jure 
segregation.  More than 40 years after the beginning of the Civil Rights Movement, this 
nation can proudly demonstrate that much of its de jure segregation has been reversed.  But de 
facto segregation continues to proliferate among the nation’s schools and workforce.  As 
Justice Breyer wrote in his Parents Involved dissent, “the potential consequences of the 
plurality's approach”208 threaten a return to the type of segregation that race-preference 
policies have kept at bay since it effectively limits the use of race-preference policies except 
in the most limited circumstances.209
 Fortunately for those in favor of race-preference policies, history reveals that often it 
is a Justice’s concurrence that moves courts in a desired direction.  Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence, like Justice Powell’s “majority of one” in Bakke, promises hope that future 
race-preference policies created in response to de jure discrimination would survive strict 
scrutiny.  According to Justice Kennedy and four other dissenting justices, there is a 
compelling governmental interest in remedying instances of de facto segregation.  
Consequently, governmental entities would be permitted to enforce race-preference policies 
upon a showing that their policy was narrowly tailored. 
 As our nation moves forward, plaintiffs will continue to challenge the vestiges of 
programs created in response to consent decrees along with initiatives that prohibit the use 
of race remedial measures in any instance.  Race preference programs have effectively 
eradicated the long-standing segregation problems that earlier plagued our country. 
                                                 
208 Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 426 U.S. at 2832. 
209 See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
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Programs like the Louisville and Seattle School Board programs are the pinnacle of success, 
achieving the racial balance they originally sought.  But a real danger in a return to de facto 
segregation lies in eliminating these programs or the ability to continue to use these 
programs once they achieve their goals.  Fortunately, reviewing courts have some means by 
which to uphold race-preference policies.  Justice Kennedy’s conclusion that there is a 
compelling governmental interest in remedying de facto segregation provides Civil Rights 
optimists with hope for the future.  
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